NATO Faces Costly Challenge in Defending Against Russian Drones

As NATO countries enhance their defensive measures in response to increasing incursions by Russian drones, the financial burden of missile defence systems has raised concerns about the alliance’s preparedness for large-scale assaults. Recent events saw Poland and its NATO partners successfully intercept up to 19 Shahed-style drones that entered Polish airspace from Russia and Belarus.

Frank Rose, a former Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance under President Barack Obama, noted that Poland and its allies “responded quickly and effectively” to the breach. This situation follows Russian President Vladimir Putin declaring that Russia is “at war” with NATO, accompanied by veiled threats of nuclear confrontation.

The costs associated with these defensive actions are staggering, amounting to millions of pounds for the deployed missile interceptors. Each Russian drone has a manufacturing cost estimated between £30,000 and £75,000, according to various assessments. The Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) suggests a more conservative average production expense of £30,000, based on studies that cite production costs ranging from £15,000 to £60,000.

In stark contrast, the interceptors used by Poland and its allies, such as the Sidewinder AMRAAM (Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles), significantly exceed the cost of the drones. Rose reported that each Sidewinder AMRAAM costs between £225,000 and £300,000. The U.S. Department of Defense’s fiscal budget for 2021 indicated a slightly higher cost ranging from £320,000 to £350,000, depending on the military branch.

Patriot missile defence systems were also prepared during the mid-September drone incursion into Poland, but were not deployed. If used, the cost differential would have been even more pronounced, with each Patriot missile interceptor priced at approximately £775,000 to around £3 million, according to various estimates. This would be over 40 times the highest estimated cost of a Shahed drone.

Rose commented on the financial disparity, stating, “This is a big problem right now with missile defence: the cost-curve challenge. We’re extending million-pound interceptors to go after £48,000 to £52,000 drones.” He emphasized the need to find solutions that address this imbalance in cost-effectiveness.

The U.S. is also grappling with a diminished capacity to replenish its stockpile of missile interceptors. This issue stems from two key factors: the U.S. has been supplying interceptors to allies, including Israel, and the domestic industrial base has suffered from long-term neglect. Rose highlighted that the U.S. has deployed a substantial quantity of Standard Missile 3 interceptors to protect Israel from recent threats.

Data from U.S. Navy sources and CSIS indicate that the U.S. launched at least a dozen Standard Missile 3 interceptors in response to Iranian attacks against Israel earlier in 2024. However, this has left the U.S. with fewer interceptors available, as production is a lengthy and costly process. Each Patriot SM-3 interceptor can cost between £7.5 million and £21 million, making them at least 300 times more expensive than the Russian drones. In 2023, the U.S. manufactured only 71 of these missiles, and demand surged in 2024 due to ongoing conflicts.

Rose noted that the challenge of rebuilding the U.S. weapons stockpiles is compounded by changes in the defence industrial landscape. During the early 2000s, U.S. forces eliminated short-range air defence platforms, redirecting funds towards ground troop enhancements. “We basically lost a whole bunch of short-range capabilities,” he remarked, indicating a significant shortcoming in U.S. and NATO defences.

The former official suggested that simply restarting production of these capabilities is not straightforward. “Once you lose a capability, it’s hard to develop it and get it back,” he warned. In light of these challenges, he advocated for the development of more affordable technologies to effectively counter these less expensive drones at scale.

He proposed that new technological advancements, such as microwave technology and solid-state lasers, could provide viable solutions. These innovations are essential to counter emerging threats, particularly in the realm of drone swarms—coordinated attacks that could involve dozens of synchronized drones.

Rose pointed out that the evolving nature of warfare, particularly as demonstrated in Ukraine, is reshaping strategic considerations. He expressed concern that the U.S. is not sufficiently prepared to address these new challenges, stating, “We are failing. We are not putting enough money into this challenge, and we’re not moving fast enough.”

Despite these concerns, there is potential for the U.S. to learn from both adversaries and allies. Recent publications within the defence community underscore the importance of increased defence expenditures to address threats from drone swarms and advanced combat technologies.

While critics have historically deemed missile defence systems ineffective, recent successes in Israel and Ukraine challenge that narrative. Rose emphasized the effectiveness of systems like the Patriot and Aegis Ballistic Missile Defence, which have demonstrated high success rates in intercepting targets.

“My hope is that the United States and NATO are learning from how the Ukrainians have evolved their capabilities to defend against such attacks,” he said. He urged a comprehensive assessment of the lessons learned in Ukraine to inform U.S. and NATO defence strategies moving forward.